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Abstract
Organisations increasingly have to deal with complex problems. They often use multidisciplinary teams to cope
with such problems where different team members have different perspectives on the problem, different individual
knowledge and skills, and different approaches on how to solve the problem. In order to solve those problems,
team members have to share their existing knowledge and construct new knowledge. Theory suggests that nego-
tiation of common ground can positively affect team decision making on the solution of complex problems, by
facilitating knowledge sharing across perspectives. In a small scale study with student groups, external representa-
tions supported by a specific negotiation ontology were used to facilitate negotiation by encouraging participants
to make their beliefs and values explicit. Results showed that the external representations supported clarifying
contributions to group members and increased group participation in discussions.
Key words: complex problems, common ground, negotiation of meaning, negotiation of position, decision making,
decision support, ICT-tools
The many-sidedness of complex societal problems underlines the need for rich problem con-
ceptualisations, and thus the need for multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder approaches.
However, forming heterogeneous teams to solve complex problems is no guarantee for a
good solution since, especially in the case where teams are formed to include different per-
spectives, team members can have difficulties in understanding each other and in sharing
knowledge. Bromme, Rambow and Nu¨ckles (2001) found that people tend to make biased
estimates about the knowledge of their discussion partners, which may result in ample
explanations of what is widely known, or ignorance or misunderstanding. Bechky (2003)
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found that problems on the work floor caused misunderstandings between workers from
different departments due to their different perspectives. Bechky noted that in order to solve
the work floor problems, different workers would first negotiate some common ground (i.e.,
a common frame of reference) to bridge the differences in perspective and be able to share
knowledge from their different viewpoints.
Much effort has been expended in the development of decision support-tools for the fa-
cilitation of complex problem solving. Traditionally, these tools aimed at facilitating formal
and informal communication, harvesting knowledge, and building knowledge repositories
(Courtney 2001). However, they did not facilitate bridging the gaps between different per-
spectives. As Hasan and Gould (2001) lament: “There has been an unfortunate tendency to
view both the computerised information systems and the decision makers as comparable
information processors” (p. 71). A different decision support-approach is needed to meet
the requirements of facilitating complex problem solving.
Recent approaches to decision-support rooted in operational research use aspects of
problem structure as a basis for the development of decision support. For example, group
model building (Vennix 1996) is a means to capture the structure and behaviour of a spe-
cific class of complex systems, namely information feedback systems, in which decisions
affect the decision environment in such ways that long-term effects of a particular de-
cision may radically differ and even counteract short-term effects. The strategic choice
approach (Friend and Hickling 1987; Friend 2001; Hickling 2001), also an example of
a problem structuring method, is a planning methodology rooted in notions about uncer-
tain knowledge about and interconnectedness of complex problems and how to cope with
them. These Group Decision Support Systems have many and different aims, but share the
need for successful negotiation processes (Eden 1992). Indeed, they often use techniques
such as transitional or visual interactive modelling that require common ground, and in
that way implicitly facilitate its negotiation (e.g., Vennix; Richardson and Anderson 1995).
However, their design does not explicitly take the negotiation of common ground into
account.
Fisher and Ury (1982) detail the importance of principled negotiation processes. They
show that even when large differences of position are present, for example in the case of
diplomatic issues, it is important to try and see the problem from the other’s perspective
instead of focusing on the other’s position. This principle of negotiation indicates a notion
of negotiating common ground before negotiating an entire solution/deal. In other words, it
is not just negotiation that is important to complex problem solving, but especially the way
negotiation takes place.
This article approaches decision support as a group-processes phenomenon. It presents
a framework for designing decision support for complex problem solving in multidisci-
plinary teams, and proposes a methodology for testing these designs. First some aspects of
complexity and multidisciplinarity are dealt with. Then the framework is described, with
an emphasis on theory about common ground (Bromme 2000). It is argued that negotiating
common ground can be afforded by making individual team members’ perspectives explicit
to the others.
From this framework a set of primitives, basic building blocks (Dillenbourg 2002) for
the design of decision support, is derived. The overarching question discussed in this article
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is how to design tools for the externalisation of individual perspectives, and how to measure
their effects.
The second part of this article reports on a small scale study aimed at making the process
of grounding visible and whereby an attempt was made to measure common ground in six
student groups.
Complexity
Whereas traditional problems can be solved with knowledge from one discipline, occur
within one societal sector, and involve only one actor, complex societal problems occur
across multiple scientific disciplines and societal sectors, involve multiple actors and stake-
holders, and can be seen as a web of problems (Rotmans 1998; Van Asselt 2000). For
example, the problem of high-school drop-out can be conceptualised as pedagogical, so-
cial, economic, and legal in nature. Furthermore, the interests of a variety of actors are at
stake, namely children, parents, teachers, politicians, et cetera.
Complex societal problems are inherently “wicked” (Rittel and Webber 1973). This
means that “solutions” to such problems usually cannot be tried out, so aspects like plausi-
bility and acceptability of information play an important role in problem solving. Further-
more, one “solution” is often either incomplete, and/or unacceptable since it does not or
cannot take into account the effects on, and the problems of all other stakeholders. Solving
complex problems involves making “tough decisions” (Nutt 2002); decision makers face
ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict. They can no longer follow a single claim about the
nature of the problem at hand and its solution, but instead have to consider several problem
perspectives, and search for solutions accordingly.
Lomi et al. (1997) argue that mono-disciplinary approaches to solving such problems
generally lead to adaptive or incremental solutions which remain within the boundaries
of one (the current) perspective on the problem. More importantly, they fail to generate
those innovative solutions necessary for coping with societal complexity; solutions which
cross disciplinary boundaries and take multiple perspectives on the problem into account.
Indeed, Nutt (2002) writes that decision makers who explore the claims of the various
experts and stakeholders involved tend to be more successful that those that choose one
problem perspective, which in a worst-case scenario may result in a debacle. It appears
that different perspectives are needed to understand the breadth of complex problems. In
sum, to deal with societal complexity, it is important to involve different perspectives on
the problem.
Multidisciplinarity
Team members, based on their professional and personal background, will each have their
own perspective, their own way in which they coherently and consistently “interpret and
make sense of the world” (cf. Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Van Asselt 2000). In multidis-
ciplinary and multi-stakeholder teams, the members can bring their different perspectives
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to bear on the problem, resulting in multiple representations of the problem within one
team. These different representations, when properly co-ordinated, can cater for a broad
problem scope which assists teams in going beyond adaptive and incremental solutions
(cf. Dillenbourg et al. 1995; Vennix 1996). However, different perspectives have also been
shown to give rise to misunderstandings and disagreement among decision-making team
members (e.g. Alpay et al. 1998; Boshuizen and Tabachneck-Schijf 1998; Bromme and
Nu¨ckles 1998), threatening the decision-making process itself.
Members of multidisciplinary teams make use of language either not understood by those
with other areas of expertise, or with a different meaning in another’s field (Van Someren
et al. 1998). People can make contributions which are evident from their own point of view,
but not from the perspectives of other group members. This, in turn, can lead to either
non-understanding or misunderstanding. If misunderstanding remains undetected and a
team continues to work, multiple representations may come to equal ‘multiple ignorances’.
The team may not be able to construct a coherent problem representation at all, or only
solve partial problems. It even runs the risk of unknowingly implementing contradictory
solutions to the same problem. Bromme’s (2000) theory of cognitive interdisciplinarity
holds that common ground is an important condition for knowledge sharing among different
perspectives.
Decision Support
The above shows that solving complex problems involves integrating knowledge from
different perspectives about complex systems to arrive at robust solutions. Negotiation con-
stitutes an important part of any support method for complex problem solving (Richardson
and Anderson 1995). The negotiators have to understand each other’s perspectives for nego-
tiation processes from different perspectives to evolve effectively (Fisher and Ury 1982). It
is thus important that negotiation must be seen as more than bartering. In the case of societal
complexity, it is important to first understand each other. In other words, negotiation should
start with the negotiation of common ground (Bromme 2000).
Modern Group Decision Support Systems include several tools that influence the way
negotiation takes place. For instance, in the case of group model building (Vennix 1996), the
group model that is constructed implicitly requires ownership by the whole group, which
means that all group members need sufficient understanding of the whole model to achieve
this. The same holds for Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA; Eden and
Ackermann 2001), an approach that uses cognitive maps to capture group knowledge. The
group model and the group cognitive map are both examples of transitional objects that
facilitate negotiation processes. They make individual knowledge explicit and tangible to
other group members
Many Group Decision Support Systems use transitional objects and interactive model-
ing techniques to represent a group’s or team’s ideas (Shaw Ackermann and Eden 2003).
However, they do not explicitly facilitate the negotiation process and they can not guarantee
that a group indeed negotiates sufficient common ground for solving the complex problem
at hand.
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Figure 1. From unshared knowledge to constructed knowledge.
A framework
Our framework attempts to bring complex problem solving and multidisciplinary teamwork
together by focusing on the various stages which take knowledge from being implicit in the
mind of one person to becoming a team’s explicit constructed knowledge.
The route from unshared knowledge in one participant’s head to newly constructed
knowledge in a team (see Figure 1) goes through three intermediate forms (i.e., external
knowledge, shared knowledge, and common ground) via four processes (i.e., externalisation,
internalisation, negotiation and integration).
Private knowledge is externalised when a team member makes his/her own, as yet un-
shared knowledge, explicit or tangible to others (Leontjev 1981). This can be oral, written,
symbolic, et cetera. Once a team member has made a contribution, the others can all try
to internalise this contribution. In doing so, they may consider aspects of the contributor
such as background, current situation and possible views so as to better ‘understand’ the
contribution. Also, their own beliefs and assumptions play a role while they try to under-
stand the contribution. A contribution is thus understood against the presumed perspective
of the other, as well as against one’s own perspective (Bromme 2000). Note that problem
structuring methods generally use a variety of knowledge externalisation techniques (e.g.
cognitive mapping, causal mapping, oval mapping; Rosenhead and Mingers 2001; Vennix
1996) to capture argumentation, share views, and negotiate.
Externalising and subsequently internalising each others’ knowledge does not mean that
the team members have all arrived at the same understanding (Shaw et al. 2003). Represen-
tational differences result from interpreting a contribution only in one’s own perspective (a
graphical designer has a different understanding of, and use for the term ‘elegance’ than a
computer programmer, see below) or from minimising or rejecting its validity or plausibility
due to differences in conviction or opinion (an environmentalist may reject the corporate
utterance on principle). Negotiation has to take place in order for a contribution to be ac-
cepted and agreed upon by the whole team (e.g. Dillenbourg et al. 1995; Alpay et al. 1998;
Bromme 2000).
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As an example, imagine the following. A computer programmer and a graphical user
interface designer are two members of a team designing a new user interface. At a certain
point the programmer states that the chosen solution needs to be ‘elegant’. The designer
readily agrees, but to what? The programmer meant that the program needs to be as short
as possible (her definition of elegance); the designer understood aesthetically pleasing (his
definition of elegance). There is a problem here, but as yet it remains implicit and unseen,
and no one can tell when it will surface, and how much damage it may cause in the interim.
In other words, people may think they are on common ground while at the same time
maintaining important representational differences. Such differences need to be detected
before people can effectively start negotiating a shared representation to come to a solution.
Negotiation of common ground, also called grounding, is here conceived of as a dual
concept. First there is negotiation of meaning, which, in the case of knowledge construction,
leads to an agreement regarding meaning and understanding of a contribution. Negotiation
of meaning concerns people making public to others their private understanding of some
contribution, verifying whether and to what extent their own understanding is different from
what others intended them to understand, receiving feedback on this, re-verifying, and so on.
Negotiation of meaning is thus an iterative process that takes place until “the contributor and
the partners mutually believe that the partners have understood what the contributor meant
to a criterion sufficient for the current purpose” (Clark and Schaefer 1989, the grounding
criterion). Note that the grounding criterion does not preclude situations where in fact people
do not know on what they agree or disagree, or what the positions of the others are. The
grounding criterion only concerns their beliefs, not their actual knowledge.
Negotiation of position is the second part of the negotiation concept. This concerns
people making their private opinion about some contribution public to others, checking
whether their own position is clear to others, and vice versa. It is through the process of
internalising others’ contributions, and subsequently providing feedback by word or action
about those contributions based on one’s own perspective, that common ground can be
negotiated (Alpay et al. 1998; Baker et al. 1999). Common ground is never absolute or
complete, but is an interactive and ongoing process in which assumed mutual beliefs and
mutual knowledge are accumulated and updated (Clark and Brennan 1991).
Note that this account of grounding closely resembles Pettigrew’s notion of management
of meaning (1977), which is a process of seeking legitimacy for one’s ideas. Management
of meaning, as theorised by Pettigrew, occurs through joint symbol construction, which
can be seen as an example of negotiation of meaning, and joint value use, which resembles
negotiation of position.
Starting from the common ground, new knowledge can be built by adding new relations
and concepts to the common ground, via integration. Knowledge construction is based on
the common ground the team has built, and will broaden and deepen the common ground
because the new commonly constructed knowledge becomes part of the common ground.
Primitives of Negotiation
Communication processes can be broken down into individual communication acts. A ty-
pology of communication acts then is a dialogue model. For example, Shaw et al. (2003)
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empirically derived communicative acts for knowledge sharing, thus modelling the pro-
cess of knowledge sharing. Primitives can be seen as types of communication acts for
a specific model of dialogue (Dillenbourg 2002), thus, primitives of negotiation would
be derived from a dialogue model of negotiation, in which each primitive serves as a
basic building block of the negotiation process. To make this clear, an idealised exem-
plary account of negotiation is presented and then used for identifying the primitives of
negotiation.
Negotiation can start when someone has made a contribution (externalisation), and an-
other has tried to pick it up (internalisation). When this has been done, a set of checks can
be performed as to whether the discussion partners understand each other. The receiver
compares what s/he thinks the contributor intended to say with his/her own understanding
of the contribution, verifies this understanding (often with a question or rebuttal), and upon
receiving feedback decides if there are no important differences between his/her own un-
derstanding and the contribution. The next step is deciding whether there is agreement. The
receiver of a contribution can either agree with the contributor or hold an opposing opinion.
Ideally negotiation continues until all negotiators think they understand each other suffi-
ciently, and either hold the same position or can sufficiently respect an opposing position.
Note here that this does not mean that they assume the other’s position. They respect it and
can agree to disagree.
The above account of negotiation can be used to derive some “basic building blocks”
or “primitives” of negotiation. Negotiation starts with a contribution of some sort such as
an idea or a position. A contribution does not stand on its own; rather it is based upon
ideas, experience, and background of the contributor. Every contribution can therefore be
underpinned by some sort of clarification by the contributor, which sheds light on the
meaning of the contribution, or the opinion of the contributor. This clarification can remain
implicit, for example, when the known background of the contributor sheds light on his/her
contribution, but it can also be made explicit. Clarifications are usually needed because
contributions are often not understood by the others in the way the contributor intended
them to be. In other words, the meaning behind the message is not by definition clear
(Fischer and Ostwald 2003).
Third, verification is needed for contributions to check the understanding of a con-
tribution because people articulate and understand the contribution against their own
background knowledge (Bromme 2000). A clarification is performed by the contribu-
tor, whereas the verification is performed by the one who is trying to understand the
contribution.
A fourth element is acceptance/rejection of a contribution. This refers to whether one
judges a contribution as true (acceptance), based on the explanation given, or as untrue or
unintelligible (rejection). The fifth and last primitive requires every negotiator to decide upon
a position regarding the contribution. This includes the possibility of accepting a certain
contribution, but disagreeing all the same, for example when neither person can prove the
other wrong. In such cases, people can agree to disagree, and alternate representations that
are equally legitimate can ensue.
Note that this procedure entails some aspects of procedural justice, which is “the fair-
ness of the process by which decisions are arrived at,” (Kim and Mauborgne 1995, p. 44)
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in that it facilitates bilateral communication between people with different perspectives,
without favouring any perspective. Specifically, the procedure is in line with some of the
procedural justice design guidelines described by Kim and Mauborgne, which suggest that
this procedure might increase compliance with strategic decisions.
External representations for supporting negotiation
Representations of abstract concepts exist in many cases partly in our heads, in which
case they are called internal representations, and/or partly in our environment and are
called external representations (Alpay et al. 1998). People can externalise their internal
representations to a certain extent, and capture them externally. External representations can
take many forms. The most common are self-made, idiosyncratic notes, outlines, diagrams,
flow charts and even mind maps, but there are also standardised ones such as mathematical
and scientific notations.
Making an external representation for a group process requires both a carrier of the
external representation, such as pen and paper or a software tool, and a formalism, such
as a common language or representational technique, to guide knowledge externalisation
(Suthers 2001). This formalism is thus a set of objects and rules that guides making an
external representation.
Causal mapping (Bryson et al. 2004) is a good example of a specific formalism. Bryson
et al. define it as “a word-and-arrow diagram in which ideas and actions are causally linked
with one another through the use of arrows. The arrows indicate how one idea or action leads
to another.” In other words, the formalism objects are the ideas or actions represented by the
words in the diagram, and the formalism rule for making the cause map is that the arrows to
link the ideas and actions must indicate causes and consequences. gIBIS (graphical Issue-
Based Information System; Conklin and Begeman 1987), another example of a specific
formalism, supports team design deliberation. It requires the user to distinguish between
issues, positions, and arguments (nodes) and their interrelations, using prespecified link
types (e.g., generalises, specialises, questions, supports). In gIBIS, the node and link types
are the formalism objects. Furthermore, gIBIS uses a set of rules (“legal rhetorical moves;”
Conklin and Begeman, p. 248) that describes which types of links may legally be used to
connect the nodes.
Many different formalisms exist, because they can be tailored to specific activities.
Suthers (2001), for example, developed a formalism to enhance scientific discourse, which
he implemented in a software tool called Belve´de`re R©. This formalism consists of a
small set of rules which (1) require evidence for every statement made by the group,
(2) require opposing evidence for each group statement, and (3) prompt users to check
whether the evidence supports statements other than the one it was given for. This for-
malism helps teams to distinguish between strong and weak statements, and to articulate
uncertainties.
A formalism can influence both knowledge externalisation and knowledge internalisation
(Figure 2). It can facilitate problem solving processes if it limits the problem space without
excluding information and relevant knowledge. An associated risk is using an inadequate
formalism. Consider the problem of using the Belve´de`re R© formalism, with its empirical
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Figure 2. Formalisms focus knowledge externalisation and knowledge internalisation.
scientific discourse-orientation, in fields such as law or design (cf. Verschuren 1997). Using
such an out-of-context formalism can be a hindrance at best, and counter-productive at
worst (Van Bruggen 2003). In such cases the ontology of the formalism does not fit, or even
conflicts, with the ontology of the problem domain. A formalism needs to fit the activity it
attempts to facilitate.
A Formalism Based on Negotiation Primitives
Negotiation, as previously stated, can be broken down into a small number of primitives.
The primitives can be seen as objects that result from actions by team members. A for-
malism that aims to facilitate negotiation has to support these actions. In regular com-
munication, the status of people’s statements in terms of negotiation primitives remains
implicit. Using a formalism designed to facilitate negotiation has to enable distinguish-
ing between original contributions, clarifications, verifications, et cetera, and make the
steps in negotiation explicit. By doing so, differences in understanding and opinion should
more easily surface. Table 1 presents the formalism. Rule 2 and 3 of the formalism can
be iterated until common understanding of the contribution is reached (cf. the ground-
ing criterion). Rule 4, about Acceptance/Rejection, shows the importance of clarification
and verification. For example, the statement 1 + 1 = 10, for example, is true only if
we understand (through rules 1 and 2) that the contributor is using the binary system. In
the case of irresolvable disagreement about previously accepted statements, the fifth rule
may result in multiple scenarios, each based on another value judgement (i.e., agree to
disagree).
Using the formalism is expected to induce more negotiation of meaning and negotiation
of position, because encouraging people to make their private understandings and opinions
public will make differences in understanding and opinion visible or salient (Bromme 2000).
This will be reflected in negotiation by the number of verifications and clarifications for
every original contribution. By strengthening the negotiation process, we thus expect this
formalism to increase the amount of common ground.
BEERS ET AL.
Table 1. Rules for a formalism for the facilitation of negotiation.
1. Every new issue is termed a contribution
Contributions are assumed not to be part of a team’s common ground
2. Contributions require a verification by the other team members
Every team member must verify whether their understanding of the contribution
sufficiently matches what the contributor intended, in order to assist in the
detection of differences between individual representations
3. Each verification is responded to with clarification
The original contributor has to explicitly clarify what she/he intended, in order
to overcome differences between individual representations
4. When all verifications are clarified, and no new verifications are performed, all
team members state whether they accept or reject the statement
Acceptance or rejection of a contribution is based on one’s judgement of
whether it is right. A contribution should be accepted as part of the common
ground if all accept it as true, or after it has been modified to become accepted
5. All team members are required to state their position about accepted statements
People are required to state their positions to allow for clarification/
determination of perspective, which in turn aids in the verification and
clarification of further contributions
Study
A pen-and-paper version of the formalism for supporting negotiation was tested in which
team members were requested to both state their position concerning others’ contributions
in a face-to-face setting, and to explicitly verify and clarify their contributions on a flip-over
against idiosyncratic representation and negotiation. The study was as much a test of the
formalism as it was a test of how to create the proper research setting, and a test of analysis
methods to determine:
1. whether the formalism influences negotiation of common ground;
2. how participants experience negotiation and achieving common ground; and
3. how participants used the formalism.
The formalism was expected to make negotiation more explicit. Furthermore, groups
using the formalism were expected to negotiate each contribution more thoroughly
than groups without the formalism. Finally, the formalism groups were expected to
establish more common ground than the non-formalism groups, caused by the in-
creased negotiation. Common ground was operationalised as overlap between individual
representations.
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The second aspect focusses on the validity of the research setting. Interview data were
used to draw in-depth impressions of two topics in particular, namely participants’ thoughts
about multiple perspectives and negotiation, and their awareness of grounding and perspec-
tives during collaboration. The data were used to test whether the present research setting
corresponded sufficiently to a complex problem solving situation, as perceived by the par-
ticipants, to test the uses of the formalism. Furthermore, it was intended for gaining insight
into whether participants were aware of the presence of multiple perspectives and the need
for actively achieving and maintaining common ground.
The third aspect focusses on how participants actually used the formalism, and what they
used it for.
Method
Six groups (triads) of senior college students who were given a problem-solving task were
studied. They were instructed to collaboratively carry out this task. Half of the groups were
instructed to use the formalism for working with a white- or blackboard and flip-over to
structure their collaboration (the formalism condition). The other groups could use these
materials any way they wanted to (the idiosyncratic condition). Afterwards, all participants
were interviewed.
Participants
Participants were students in their senior year from a business degree program of a Dutch
University. Participants majored in such fields as Accountancy, Marketing, Organisation
Science, and Macro-economics. Six teams were formed by dividing participants who ma-
jored in different fields into groups of three. Note that senior college students will behave
differently from real management teams in some respects, because they don’t have a shared
history, and probably will not have a future together that needs to be reckoned with during
collaboration (Eden 1995).
Materials
Task.
A task was assigned to the groups, requiring them to arrive at an investment decision for
a machine-producing company called “Thyssen and Krupp”. The assignment was derived
from the (computer) simulation game “STEER The Economy” (Woltjer 2003). Participants
were provided with a large amount of company and market data covering such diverse fields
as the company itself and its past decisions, competing companies, within-market develop-
ments, and overall macro-economic indicators. The abundance and variety of available data
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enabled complementary approaches from multiple business perspectives. The participants
received the following task description:
You are employed as an organisational consultant to analyse and advise organisations. Thyssen and Krupp, a
company which produces machines, contracts you to advise them on an investment decision. They require an
analysis of their current situation and an investment strategy for the near future (number and type of machines
ordered). All data regarding Thyssen and Krupp are available on your computer.
Formalism.
Participants were supplied with a blackboard or whiteboard (henceforth ‘board’) and flip-
over, and writing materials of different colours. Groups that used the formalisms received
the instruction to use the board and flip-over as much as possible during discussion for
writing down new topics for discussion, and for sharing opinions about those topics. Each
participant used a specific colour for writing his/her contributions.
The flip-over was to be used for clarification of contributions. Participants were to
represent their own understanding of others’ contributions on the flip-over. The original
contributor could subsequently, also on the flip-over, represent what s/he really meant. This
means that participants were not meant to discuss each other’s opinions on the flip-over.
Once sure of understanding a contribution, participants could represent this on the board
by initialling the original contribution. Finally, participants could represent their opinions
about each other’s ideas on the board, and also use the board to represent new ideas from
the discussion.
In sum, the board was intended for recording ideas and opinions and the flip-over was
intended as a means to clarify the understanding of those ideas. Participants were instructed
to begin with a short brainstorm on the board, and then continue on the flip-over with clar-
ifications. After completing those two steps, the course of discussion was free. The groups
that did not use the formalism could use the board and flip-over to their own discretion.
These groups are referred to as the idiosyncratic groups.
Interview guideline
Participants were individually interviewed to gain insight in their thoughts about perspec-
tives and negotiation, as well as their awareness of grounding and perspectives during col-
laboration. The interviews were conducted by three graduate assistants who had received
training in basic conversational and interview techniques as part of their university educa-
tion. Each interviewer conducted six individual interviews. The interviews focussed on how
the participants arrived at new ideas; how new ideas were introduced and exchanged during
collaboration; whether ideas “landed” by the other team members; whether team members
understood each other; and whether team members agreed with each other.
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Procedure
Participants were given 45 minutes to explore the simulation and browse through all the
different types of graphs and charts to get some experience with the information available
in the program.
After this exploration, participants started working on the case. In order to promote the
construction of an individual perspective, as well as to allow the researchers to determine
participants’ individual representations, participants first carried out the task individually
(pre-test) and wrote down their solutions.
Next, participants had to collaboratively carry out the task in triads. They received
a board and a flip-over to take notes. Half of the groups received the formalism in-
struction and the other half could use the materials in an idiosyncratic way. All groups
were instructed to use the flip-over for writing down their final solution to the problem
task. Participants were allowed to bring their notes. The collaboration process was video-
taped.
After the collaboration, participants were again asked to individually carry out the task
(post-test).
The interviews were conducted as soon as possible after collaboration (always within 24
hours). All interviews were tape recorded and typed out by the interviewer who conducted
them. Video recordings of the collaboration process were used during the interview to
stimulate the participant’s recall of their thoughts during collaboration. The participants
watched the video-taped collaboration process and were instructed to report the thoughts
they had had during collaboration. They were instructed to pause the video recording at any
time if they wanted to report their thoughts. The interviewers could also pause the video
recording during the interview if they wanted to ask the participants to report their thoughts,
and were instructed to do so when the participant was silent for an extended period, had
reacted fiercely to another on the video tape, and vice versa, had spent an extended period
searching for information or was neglected by the others. Figure 3 schematically represents
the procedure for one triad.
Variables and Analysis
Negotiation, common ground, and participants’ thoughts about negotiation of common
ground were analysed. Negotiation was operationalised as quality of negotiation; negotiation
per conversation topic; and participation per conversation topic during the collaboration.
Common ground was measured by comparing individual representations before and after
collaboration with respect to solutions and their justification. Thoughts about negotiation
were measured by qualitative analysis of the interview data.
Quality of negotiation
We developed a coding scheme for coding function and content of utterances during collab-
oration (cf., e.g. Thomas et al. 1982; Fischer et al. 2002; Mulder et al. 2002). All utterances
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were coded with regard to:
• Cognitive content: Utterances directly related to solving the problem.
• Regulative content: Utterances related to monitoring the problem solving process, and
regulating the collaboration process. Talk about the formalism instruction was coded
Regulation as well.
• Other content: Any utterance not in another category, or non-codable.
Utterances with cognitive content were specifically coded for function, using subcate-
gories based mainly on the primitives, namely:
• Contribution: An utterance in which a new topic of conversation not discussed before is
introduced.
• Elaboration: An utterance in which a contribution is expanded upon by either adding
more information, agreeing, disagreeing, accepting, rejecting or summarising.
• Verification: An utterance in which, directly or indirectly, information is requested about
the intended meaning of a contribution or elaboration.
• Clarification: An utterance in reaction to a verification or a perceived lack of understand-
ing, in which the intended meaning of a contribution or elaboration is elucidated.
The coding scheme originally included separate categories for acceptance, rejection,
agreement, and disagreement. However, very strict coding rules were needed to make these
categories reliable, and with these rules the number of instances of the respective utterances
was too small to be incorporated in the analyses.
Figure 3. Experimental design.
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Segmentation was done on the basis of utterances. However, acknowledgements (e.g.,
“Hmhmm,” “yeah, yeah,” etcetera) were ignored. Furthermore, if a speaker obviously
changed the type of utterance in mid-speech, it was split into two segments. Segmenta-
tion and coding were done simultaneously.
A graduate assistant was trained for 25 hours on the use of the coding scheme and
the video-coding software package The Observer R© (Noldus et al. 2000). Comparable data
from an experiment without the formalism with second-year students were used for training
purposes. Comparing a sample of 25 minutes of video-data (9% of the total amount of
videodata) coded by the first author and the graduate assistant resulted in a substantial
(Landis and Koch 1977) inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) of .68 (SE = .066). All data
were coded by the graduate assistant, blind to which trials corresponded to which condition.
Verification and clarification were seen as indicative for explicit negotiation activities.
The total number of contributions discussed was used as an indicator for the range of topics
discussed. It was assumed that the wider the range of discussed topics, the better different
perspectives were represented.
Negotiation per conversation topic
To measure the number of verifications and clarifications per conversation topic first those
episodes in the discussion that dealt with one conversation topic were identified. The con-
tributions that were identified earlier using the coding scheme served as a means to identify
these episodes. A discussion episode generally started with a contribution, and ended when
one of the participants would make a new contribution, and all the intermediate discussion
between these contributions would deal with one conversation topic.
Note that in specific cases the discussion about one topic was interspersed with discussion
of another, for example when the focus of discussion would go back and forth between topics.
In such cases all discussion about one topic would be added to one episode, even when it was
interspersed with another episode. Negotiation per conversation topic was operationalised
as the total number of verifications and clarifications per episode.
Participation per conversation topic
The participation per conversation topic was operationalised as the number of participants
that made an utterance or an acknowledgement during an episode. Effectively this means
that participation can be 1 (in case of a monologue to which no one reacts), 2, or 3 for
each conversation topic, depending on the number of speakers during the corresponding
episode.
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Common ground
A large body of research on the measurement of variables such as common ground (e.g.
shared knowledge, group mental model) exists (e.g., Bougon 1992; Langfield-Smith and
Wirth 1992; Bood 1998), which all involve some form of cognitive mapping. A cognitive
map is a representation of an individual’s or a group’s beliefs. Cognitive maps can be drawn
based on data like discussion transcripts, interviews, texts, etcetera. Subsequently, tech-
niques like content analysis can be used to code the content of the data. Finally, individual
cognitive maps can be combined to represent knowledge of a group (Bougon 1992). We used
content analysis as a technique to map the individual problem representations. Common
ground was conceptualised as the extent to which individual representations overlapped
each other with regard to content.
To characterise the content of the individual representations the group discussion content
itself was first characterised (see Figure 4). The discussion episodes identified earlier served
as a basis for characterising the discussion content. Each episode was first numbered and
labelled with a descriptive summary. For example, one of the episodes was summarised as
follows: “The current low stock of Thyssen and Krupp is only a random indication because
stock is fluctuating within the nine-month time of delivery for new machines.”
The next step involved characterising the content of the individual representations,
both prior to (pre-test) and subsequent to collaboration (post-test), as well as charac-
terising the content of the group representation. For every individual representation the
topics represented and not represented were assessed. In Figure 4, episode number 7 is
judged to be present in one of the initial individual representations (Jane’s) in the group
representation, and in all of the post-tests. By repeating this procedure for each of the
episodes in the discussion, it was determined where each conversation originated, whether
it was present in the group representation, and whether participants used it in their post-
tests.
Three different measures of common ground were used, based on different comparisons
of individual and/or group representations. The first measure concerned the overlap of
individual representations subsequent to collaboration (overlap after collaboration). The
second measure concerned the difference between overlaps of pre-tests as compared to
post-tests (change in overlap). The third measure constituted a comparison of the overlap
of the post-tests to the group representation.
Qualitative Analysis of the Interview Data
The interviews were qualitatively analysed to gain insight in the participants’ thoughts about
multiple perspectives and negotiation, and their awareness of both grounding and multiple
perspectives during collaboration. These topics are important to help judge the validity of
the research setting, that is, whether there was enough initial misunderstanding between
participants to sufficiently allow for negotiation processes, and whether the participants
were able to learn from each other through negotiation (i.e., that different perspectives
added value to solving the problem). It is also important to explore whether the participants
were aware that different perspectives apply to the task, and that there is a need for achieving
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Figure 4. Analysis of common ground; numbers indicate topics.
and maintaining common ground. The qualitative analysis was also used to gain insight in
participants’ use of the formalism, by focusing on the way the participants used the board
and flip-over.
To address these questions, all reported thoughts from the interview transcripts about
any of the aforementioned aspects of negotiation were gathered and categorised. To assess
differences between formalism and idiosyncratic groups it was determined whether some
thoughts occurred only in the formalism groups and not in the idiosyncratic groups for each
topic, and vice versa.
The qualitative analysis was carried out by the first author.
Results
Quality of negotiation
Table 2 shows the mean number of occurrences for each of the primitives for both the for-
malism and the idiosyncratic groups. Formalism groups worked longer than idiosyncratic
groups. During that time, they discussed more contributions, and each of these contributions
was negotiated more thoroughly, as shown by the amount of negotiation of meaning per
contribution, than in the idiosyncratic groups. In general, the number of verifications and
clarifications was higher in the formalism groups than in the idiosyncratic groups. Mann-
Whitney testing showed that the difference in number of clarifications was marginally
significant, U(N = 6) = .500, p = .072. Furthermore, in the formalism groups the mean
number of participants per conversation episode was significantly higher than in the id-
iosyncratic groups, χ2(2, N = 150) = 8.77, p < .05. No other differences were found to be
statistically significant, although all of the observed differences were sizeable and in the ex-
pected direction only. Seeing as how the sample was small and the research was explorative
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Table 2. Negotiation primitives.
Formalism groups Idiosyncratic groups
M SD M SD
Group time on task (in seconds) 3181 394 2341 579
Contributiona 27.0 7.8 23.0 4.4
Verificationa 17.0 5.2 10.7 3.5
Clarificationa,# 23.3 7.5 14.7 1.2
Negotiation of meaninga 40.3 12.2 25.3 2.5
Elaborationa 197.3 57.6 151.7 18.8
Regulationa 30.0 6.6 24.0 13.1
Othera 43.0 14.2 32.7 21.2
Negotiationb per contribution 1.7 1.0 1.1 0.1
Participants per episode∗ 2.8 0.22 2.5 0.09
a The unit for this variable is the utterance. For example, with regard to Contribution,
this means that in the formalism groups on average 27 utterances were coded
Contribution.
b Negotiation is meant here as negotiation of meaning, and consists of the sum of
all verifications and clarifications.
# p < .10;∗ p < .05.
in nature, this was not unexpected. On the whole, the data suggest that the formalism groups
negotiated longer, more and more thoroughly than the idiosyncratic groups.
Common ground
Table 3 shows that the participants in the formalism group discussed more topics than the par-
ticipants in the idiosyncratic group. Also, the members of the formalism groups mentioned
Table 3. Common ground.
Formalism groups Idiosyncratic groups
M SD M SD
Total number of episodes 27.0 7.8 23.0 4.4
In one pre-test 12.0 3.6 11.7 2.9
In two pre-tests 2.7 1.5 2.7 2.9
In three pre-tests 1.0 1.0 .3 .6
External representation 10.7 2.3 13.0 7.8
Solution 6.3 5.1 4.0 1.7
In one post-test 7.3 3.1 6.3 1.2
In two post-tests 4.3 2.1 4.7 1.5
In three post-tests 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.7
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more different discussion topics in their post-test problem representations. However, the
idiosyncratic groups captured more discussion topics on their group external representa-
tion than the formalism groups (M = 13.0 vs. M = 10.7) as can be seen in Table 3.
Furthermore, the number of discussion topics mentioned in the post-tests (overlap af-
ter collaboration) by all members is the same for both conditions (M = 2.0, number of
discussion topics in three individual representations), which means that no difference in
common ground was found. Adding pre-tests to the measurement of common ground
(measuring change in overlap) suggests a bit more common ground in the idiosyncratic
groups.
When comparing the overlap between post-tests to what was in the external repre-
sentation, the idiosyncratic groups, although they captured more topics on their exter-
nal representation, did not subsequently show more overlap between individual post-
tests.
It may be the case that the present analysis method was too crude to make the differences
between the groups visible. For example, one person in one of the idiosyncratic groups
decided to externally represent all her contributions, which heavily coloured the results.
This practice also indicates that social loafing (Latane´, Williams and Harkins 1979) may
have influenced the outcome measure for common ground. One of the formalism groups, on
the other hand, decided to not write anything down before all agreeing upon it. Although this
meant acting in the spirit of the formalism, it led to an under-representation of contributions
on the board.
Participants’ Thoughts, Perspectives and Negotiation
The qualitative analysis yielded observations about multiple perspectives and negotiation
and participants’ awareness of grounding and perspectives. Interview excerpts are provided
to give the reader an impression of the data that informed our observations.
Multiple perspectives and negotiation
In the interview data, the presence of multiple perspectives is apparent through frequent
misunderstandings among participants and through the experience of benefiting from each
others’ contributions in solving the task.
The interview data indicate that at a number of moments participants detected a misun-
derstanding on the part of one of their discussion partners. Sometimes they felt they were
justified in this judgement, for example, when it was plain from discussions that one of
the discussion partners was not able to follow the discussion at all. At other times though,
participants merely assumed that one of their discussion partners was incorrect. In some
of these cases these participants had no intention of questioning their own views, even if
it later became apparent that they themselves were ‘wrong’ and their discussion partners
‘right’:
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“‘Cause she said much, but half of it wasn’t relevant.”
“If you ask me, the one on the left, I think she just lost it.”
“But at that point I thought, no, that’s really a stupid remark. And later on he even convinces me, if I recall correctly.
But at that point I immediately think, no, that’s stupid.”
At times, participants would sense a major misunderstanding between them and their
discussion partners without trying to repair this misunderstanding:
“This is really bad of me. Cause I nod while I haven’t heard a word of what she said.”
In the above misunderstandings, there was no attempt to repair them, based upon
the interview data. Participants seemed to be content with their own, or their part-
ners’, lack of understanding for the purpose of solving the case. Such misunderstand-
ings, without ambition to overcome them, were observed in both the idiosyncratic and
the formalism groups. The data suggest that the formalism does not support negotia-
tion in cases where participants are not at all interested in trying to understand each
other.
Despite the misunderstandings mentioned above, participants also reported that they had
the opportunity to learn from each other during the problem solving process:
“I enjoyed seeing how you can build on one another until you reach a good answer.”
From the interview data it seems that participants felt they were able to achieve a better
result collaboratively than they would have by themselves, because they gathered knowledge
and insights from their discussion partners and in some cases collaboratively constructed
the meaning of some piece of data in the computer system.
“At this point I’m finding out that through discussions you can gain far more insight in what’s happening.”
Participants in both the formalism and the idiosyncratic groups reported that they were
able to profit from each other.
The above observations indicate that the research setting, i.e., a higher education prob-
lem solving situation, in principle offered enough opportunity for negotiation activities,
if misunderstandings become explicit and there is commitment to address them. The
setting appeared to allow for collaborative negotiation of meaning and knowledge con-
struction, as the participants reported being able to benefit from each other’s knowledge.
From these observations it is apparent that the setting under study allows for studying the
framework.
Participants’ awareness of grounding and perspectives
Participants’ awareness of grounding is apparent from the interview data in two ways. First,
various interview excerpts show that participants consciously account for each others’
business expertises. Second, there are several instances in which participants consciously
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clarify and verify their understanding, in various degrees of commitment to achieving and
maintaining common ground.
From the interviews it seems that participants deemed the differences in background
between them and their partners relevant to the topic at hand:
“But I had heard that she had done Econometrics, was currently doing Economics, so she’s probably looking at
totally different things than we are.”
“I don’t know what they majored in, but I think they know more about company management than I do.”
On the other hand, sometimes perspectives were seen as a cause of ignorance:
“I also thought, he’s studying Econometrics, so maybe he doesn’t really get the picture.”
In both idiosyncratic and formalism groups, participants were aware of such differences
in perspective.
In sum, it appeared that the participants linked the perspective of their discussion partners
to differences in problem representations, and that they thought that these different perspec-
tives might add new points of view to the discussions. Both acknowledging the difference
between understanding and agreement and acknowledging differences in perspective can be
seen as a prerequisite for effectively using the formalism, because the rules of the formalism
imply a certain awareness of these differences.
The interview data also suggested various, qualitatively different ways in which partic-
ipants reported activities related to grounding. Three ways in which participants attended
to their team partners’ contributions were observed. First, they actively tried to increase
participation of the discussion partners, especially in the case of someone who was very
quiet:
“I wanted to hear what she had to say. Because she had been quiet for some time already.”
“So I let him finish, that speaks for itself, that you hear what someone’s got to say.”
A second example of grounding was being actively open to feedback from discussion
partners, and being able to accept it. In various cases participants made contributions that
their discussion partners deemed false. In such cases, being open to arguments against one’s
own position is seen as being open to clarifications from other team members:
“So maybe [I didn’t make] the best suggestion, but the feedback was very good. Both [team partners] gave me
a reason why you could see it differently.”
“I liked that. . . . .they explained to me how I arrived at a wrong interpretation.”
The third way takes commitment to grounding one step further. There were specific
cases where participants reported an active effort to achieve common ground in cases of
misunderstanding on the part of one of their discussion partners, even when this discussion
partner did not actively request any further explanation or clarification and could have been
easily ignored:
“And it’s probably from his eyes that I could tell, or his way of, I don’t know, his behaviour at that moment,
and that’s why I thought, I have to ask if he understands it. Because at that moment I’m like, he doesn’t get it.”
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“I tried to explain it to him in such a way that he might understand it as well.” “We found a conclusion of which
I found that it was one hundred percent of what the three of us thought . . . . . What I found most important, was
that we had a conclusion we all could support [rather] than a conclusion that was one hundred percent correct, but
to which one of us did not agree.”
In conclusion, despite often misunderstanding each other, or having disagreements, par-
ticipants also actively tried to establish common ground. This was apparent in attempts to
involve silent team members in the discussion, in being open to feedback from others, and
in actively trying to repair misunderstandings. This last type of commitment to grounding
was only observed in the formalism groups. The other types grounding were observed in
both formalism and idiosyncratic groups.
Use of the Formalism
In the interviews, the participants mentioned various uses of the board. The most important
use seems to be that it acts as a record for points that everyone agrees upon. When something
is written down on the board, it seems to get the status of common ground. This was the
case for both the formalism groups and the idiosyncratic groups:
“I didn’t really agree with what he said. You can tell, ‘cause I didn’t write it down.”
In some cases participants attributed a certain status to a point of discussion if it was
written on the board:
“So just confirming officially by writing it on the board.”
The board also was reported to help structure the discussion. Participants saw the use of
the board as a mechanism to keep track of the various topics that had been discussed, and
sometimes used it as a structuring tool by using specific space on the board for a specific
part of the case (for example, the left side of the board for market analysis, and the right
side for company analysis):
“And I thought if we don’t write that down we’re gonna lose structure, so.”
Furthermore, in some cases participants who brought little to the discussion judged that
they could make themselves useful by writing things down on the board. From the interview
data it is also clear that this was seen as useful by the discussion partners:
“Then I’ll start writing on the board. That way I can do something useful as well.”
The board thus appeared to serve as a lasting record for knowledge that was part of
common ground, as a means to structure the discussion, and even as an excuse for hav-
ing relatively little to contribute in terms of content. Participants did not, however, report
thoughts in which they linked use of the board to the formalism.
COMMON GROUND AND DECISION MAKING
Conclusion and Discussion
This article introduces a framework for decision support of multidisciplinary teams, and an
exploratory study to test its method.
With regard to negotiation, results indicate that the formalism groups spent more time
on negotiation processes than those not given the formalism (i.e., who used their own
idiosyncratic representation method). Furthermore, members of the formalism groups par-
ticipated in more of the discussion topics than those in the idiosyncratic groups. This,
and the fact that the formalism groups discussed more conversation topics than the id-
iosyncratic groups, suggests a more equal representation of different perspectives in the
collaboration process than in the idiosyncratic group. Difficulties in following the formal-
ism might be an alternative explanation for the difference in total time on task. However,
such difficulties are not represented in the number of contributions, verifications, clari-
fications or elaborations, since talk about the formalism was coded as regulation. With
regard to common ground, the results did not indicate any differences or trends between the
groups. This may be due to the crudeness of the common ground-measure used here. Also,
possible confounding factors like social loafing have not been taken into account. If the
formalism did positively influence the extent of common ground, it was not apparent in the
results.
Other researchers have also developed formalised discussion techniques to facilitate
decision making, e.g., the Nominal Group Technique (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974) and
the Delphi technique (Rowe and Wright 1999). These techniques are similar to the formalism
tested here in that they both have separate phases for evaluation and clarification of ideas,
but they differ in that they close off with rounds of voting, which effectively removes
the possibility of agreeing to disagree. Van de Ven and Delbecq found that both Delphi
and the Nominal Group Technique increased the number of contributions as compared to
groups without a specific formalism, just as our results with the negotiation formalism.
Also, participants in their studies opined that they had little time to think each other’s
ideas through, whereas participants using Delphi or Nominal Group Techniques interacting
groups reported having ample opportunity to do so. These results are like ours; the formalism
increased negotiation activities, which indicates that participants considered others’ ideas
more than in idiosyncratic groups.
With respect to the first research question, namely whether the formalism influences the
way negotiations take place, the results lend credence to the hypothesis that the formalism is
able to make negotiation more explicit, and so facilitate the negotiation of common ground.
The interview data shed some light on participants’ experiences of negotiation of common
ground. Participants report that they can benefit from each other’s knowledge throughout
solving the case, and appear to consciously take action to repair detected misunderstandings
on the part of their discussion partners. According to Ostwald (1996) this is an important
aspect of the grounding process; repairing a breakdown in understanding results in an
increase in common ground. Furthermore, participants showed active commitment to ne-
gotiating and maintaining common ground, through consciously paying attention to each
other and shaping their clarifications to the perspective of their team members. The results
suggested that commitment to grounding was exercised most actively in the formalism
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groups. However, as the study was of an exploratory nature more research is needed to
allow for firmer conclusions.
From the interviews it was clear that the board served a variety of purposes dur-
ing the collaboration. It did not become clear whether the participants were aware of
the formalism as intended in this specific setting. Nonetheless, participants did discuss
their formalism instructions during work. for example when they were deciding whether
to use the board or the flip-over to record their ideas. From a methodological perspec-
tive, these results indicate that laboratory setting studied here offered enough opportu-
nities for grounding processes to take place. It can be concluded that the present re-
search setting acted as a valid model of multidisciplinary problem-solving for studying the
framework.
The present study excluded possible learning effects, because it only offered the partici-
pants one attempt at using the formalism. With repeated attempts, participants conceiv-
ably might become more adept at recognising differences in representation, and more
experienced in using verifications and clarifications to repair misunderstandings. This
raises the question whether participants can learn the rules of the formalism and ul-
timately apply them without the instruction to use the formalism. Also, it alludes to
the possibility that participants identify unintended uses of the formalism that have not
been described here (cf. Nunamaker et al. 1991), which indicates an appropriation of the
formalism.
There were some cases where participants were conscious of misunderstanding and did
not repair it. This finding requires discussion because it may have implications for the effects
of the formalism in a practical setting. Some aspects of “presentation of self” (Goffman
1959) may play a part here. Participants may have been more interested in conveying the
message of understanding the others, of being on common ground, than to convey a message
of mutual difference, as would be clear when misunderstandings would have been made
explicit. They would face a trade-off between their presentation of self and repairing a
misunderstanding, where making a misunderstanding explicit is not in the best interests of
presenting an “optimal” self.
The question is what the implications of this result are for the effectiveness of the for-
malism in a professional situation with large interests at stake. For example, what will
managers do when they are confronted with colleagues who hold views they deem incor-
rect/misunderstood? If the colleague is perceived as a competitor, the manager might wait
and hope for a mistake without ever making the misunderstanding explicit. If however, such
a mistake would reflect on the manager’s esteem, she/he might try to persuade the colleague
to his/her own view, even so much as to not be open at all to the colleague’s clarifications.
The point here is that in professional situations, a number of strategic considerations absent
from the laboratory setting may play a role that might influence the extent to which discus-
sion partners are willing to make their private understandings and positions public. More
research is needed to gain insight in negotiation processes in the presence of such strategic
considerations.
In the present study, a pen-and-paper implementation of the formalism was used. This
appeared to have certain drawbacks compared to an ICT-implementation (Beers et al. 2005).
For example, one can only hope, and cannot enforce, that participants sufficiently follow
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instructions, and make use of all the materials that are part of these instructions. Furthermore,
little can be done about participants unwilling to follow the instructions. Had an ICT-
implementation of the formalism been used, participants could have been “forced” into
certain activities to make them adhere more closely to the formalism. Further research is
needed to decisively test this. In future studies, scripting methods in ICT-tools, can “force”
or “coerce” participants to adhere to the formalism more closely.
At present a number of ICT-tools for group support exists (e.g., Belve´de`re R©, Suthers
2001; gIBIS, Conklin and Begeman 1987). The formalism presented here is rooted in
theory about negotiation of common ground, a specific discussion type. In that sense it is
similar to Group Systems (Nunamaker et al. 1991). Group Systems is an electronic meeting
system that consists of a toolkit aimed at things like group memory, group interaction,
and session management. For example, it has a specific tool to facilitate the process of
brainstorming. With Group Systems, a team uses a series of different tools selected for the
purpose of the group meeting, with each tool supporting a specific meeting activity. One way
to implement the formalism could be as a Group Systems tool to be used in case negotiation
of common ground is particularly important. As such it could support Group Systems
activities like exploration and idea generation (Nunamaker et al.); the formalism could
aid idea exploration through the explication of individual representation, and subsequently
affording the negotiation of common ground. As such, the formalism would structure part
of the group process.
Eden (1992) writes about the importance of negotiation processes for Group Decision
Support Systems in general. On the one hand, Eden emphasises the importance of main-
taining social order when using group decision support systems, while on the other hand
enough diversity needs to remain to prevent phenomena like “group think.” According to
Eden, a way around this problem is to increase participants’ commitment by letting them
experience their problem from the other’s perspective. Our results show that the formalism
presented here might facilitate this process. The implications of our results for group deci-
sion support systems then are that paying attention to the negotiation of common ground
by having participants verify their understanding, and them explicate their positions could
increase the effectiveness of group decision support systems.
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